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Russian Energy Policy
Abstract

The Russian Federation is an economic powerhouse in the global market. Their
significant energy exports, along with their own consumption, draws upon huge reserves of
nonrenewable fossil fuels. Despite the known effects this use has on the environment, and the
limited availability of such resources, Russia outwardly has given no indication of slowing their
consumption. The increasing viability of renewable energy has led some other countries to begin
development, decreasing reliance on fossil fuels. Among many, there is a growing vision of a
future where renewable resources power the world. This has led to speculation about the
possible plans of those countries which have not yet started promoting renewable energy
development. Russia in particular has been difficult to scry where renewable energy is
concerned. This paper examines potential factors that could affect Russia's decision making
regarding renewable energy policies. Three research questions arose: (1) Does Russia really
have an interest in developing renewable energies? (2) What is Russia' s true political energy
agenda? (3) Who influences Russia's policymaking process? These three questions capture the
heart of Russia's dilemma, and indicate the most likely outcome. This paper examines existing
literature and compiles and analyzes relevant data in an attempt to answer these three questions,
and from there the overarching question: is Russia likely to begin promoting renewable energy
use and development? This thesis, while acknowledging the uncertainties inherent in predicting
a foreign country's future policy, finds that the most likely outcome is a continued reliance on
and promotion of traditional fossil fuel energy resources, with little to no state encouragement of
renewable energy.
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Introduction

In order to understand the importance of the research being conducted, it is necessary to
know more about its subject. Russia's massive territory spans two continents, covering a total of
17,098,240 square kilometers (FAO 2017). Population density is low across the country, with
much land occupied by farms or completely uninhabited by man. Figure 1 demonstrates the
concentration of people in smaller regions, with large swaths of relatively empty land.
Figure 1. Population Density of Russia by District
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Note: population density displayed is relative to districts of Russia only. Data was unavailable
for the district shown in the center of the map.
Russia's vast isolation adds not only to its mystery, but also to its stake in the global
energy market. While not densely packed, the country's population is still large enough to
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consume a significant amount of energy resources. However, the land itself is what gives Russia
its power- electrical and economic. Beneath the sparsely populated swaths of land lies a
treasure trove of oil and natural gas, and Russia has taken advantage of this, managing to provide
for themselves while also cornering the European energy market, as well as some of Asia. This
makes Russian energy vitally important to the country's economy. However, that still does not
explain why it matters to those outside Russia.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union's development was intensely scrutinized by US
government officials, journalists, and the general public. Whatever Russia did, scientifically, the
US wanted to do better. Whatever they did politically, the US wanted to fight. However, the
end of the Cold War- while certainly not ending the American fascination with its once-enemy
- allowed this focus to lapse. In many ways, this was for the best. Such an obsession had very
nearly turned the fear of mutually assured destruction into reality. The entire American school
system had been overhauled in order to "best" the Russians. Proxy wars were fought in
increasingly remote communist countries- not only remote in their physical distance from the
United States, but also in their metaphysical distance from the root of the conflict. With the
much-needed relaxation of America's focus on Russia, it is easy to question why it is now so
important to understand their motives and future plans, especially in an area so innocuous as
renewable energy policy.
Russia's hulking economic influence finds its way into global areas of interest through
the ubiquitous need for energy, and the pressure that comes from having one major supplier in a
region. Though the US largely depends on its own reserves and the Middle East for fossil fuels,
Europe and parts of Asia depend heavily on Russia's energy exports. This means that no matter
how distant their decisions may seem, Russia's energy policy decisions will likely ripple across

6

Russian Energy Policy
the world, hitting the US and allies alike. Furthermore, air pollution as a result of the use of
fossil fuels has long been recognized as a transnational problem. This is especially true in the

case of Russia, with their constant exports of fossil fuels continuing to feed pollution throughout
Europe. As such, Russia's decisions regarding renewable energy are a matter of vital importance
to all countries, including the US. For those reasons, this paper will attempt to use evidence
collected to make a prediction for Russia's future stance and actions toward renewable energy
policy.
Answering the Research Questions

When studying the future energy trends of a country, three questions are particularly useful in
formulating a prediction of future behavior. The first is, "Does this country really have an
interest in developing renewable energy?" It is important to consider the same factors that the
leaders of the country itself will be using to make their decision, and the answer to this question
can provide insight into what kind of policy they will be most likely to choose. The second
question asks, "What is the country's true agenda?" Regardless of the country's interest, its
leaders will likely have shown some indication of what sort of policy they prefer to enact, and
what sort of energy development they will promote. Finally, the third question is, "Who controls
or influences the country's policymaking process?" This goes beyond the demonstrated
preferences of a country's leaders, to the actors who are likely playing a role in making those
decisions. This can allow for a more accurate reflection of the future policy process, because the
actors may make different decisions in the future than they have in the past, so it is important to
know more about what may influence each actor's decision. This section of the paper attempts
to answer each of the three research questions as they apply to Russia.
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Does Russia really have an interest in developing renewable energy?
One essential factors in determining Russia's future energy policies is the country's
interest in renewable energy development. This interest is comprised of Russia's renewable
energy potential, as determined by its available resources; domestic benefits of developing this
industry; improved international reputation and trade; and environmental benefits. However,
working against said interest are negative domestic consequences, international backlash, and a
potential disinterest in environmental issues. This section of the paper will study these factors in
order to make a judgement as to whether Russia truly has an interest in developing renewable
energy.
Possibly the most important influencer in a country's level of interest is its reservoir of
renewable energy resources - without enough resources, all other factors become irrelevant.
This, however, is not likely to be a problem for Russia. Russia's previously mentioned, sizable
landmass allows for many renewable resources to be explored. In particular, Russia' s long
coastlines and mountains provide an ideal environment for wind farms. Wind speeds, the
greatest natural factor in determining the amount of energy a wind farm can produce, are
adequate or more than adequate everywhere from the eastern and southwestern coasts to the far
north surrounding the Ural Mountains and Lake Baikal (Brown 2005). This means that Russia
can count on wind energy even in remote areas where fossil fuels are scarce and cannot easily be
delivered. However, another resource is even more plentiful, apparently, than the wind: biomass.
Biomass is defined by Anna Brown as "non-fossil organic materials produced by photosynthesis
and having intrinsic chemical energy content" (2005, 35). According to Brown, Russia is the
largest producer of biomass in the world with 15 billion tons produced annually (2005). Russia' s
development of these biomass resources is currently extremely limited, leaving an incredible
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potential energy resource relatively untapped. A relatively unknown source of renewable energy
is geothermal energy. Geothernml energy, as the name suggests, uses the Earth's internal heat to
produce energy. Because of this, it is more efficient in seismically active areas where the Earth's
heat is closer to the surface, such as Russia's volcanic Kuril Islands (Brown 2005). There are
other regions with less seismic activity which still offer a great amount of potential for
production of geothermal energy, creating yet another abundant resource that has been only
minimally exploited in the country. One ofthe more globally common forms of renewable
energy even in countries focused primarily on development of fossil fuels, hydropower has the
same importance in Russia. Hydropower makes up 27.1% of the country's installed powergenerating capacity (Brown 36). However, Russia's potential is even greater, given that it has
the second highest level of yearly river runoff in the world. For comparison, Brazil, which has
the highest level, in 2013 generated 80% of its electricity in hydroelectric plants (Sibaja 2013).
Location of resources can make their potential even greater: all of these renewable energy
resources can be harnessed in northwestern Russia. This area is ideal for its proximity to Europe,
and, more specifically, the European Union, one of the largest importers ofRussian oil and
natural gas (Boute et. al. 2012). If Russia's interest in renewable energy development were
determined by the abundance of resources alone, there would be no doubt that its future should
lie with renewable energy.
A key point in examining factors for or against renewable energy in Russia is
understanding the conflicting motivations that Russian policymakers must be feeling. The
Russian economy has long depended on energy, particularly fossil fuels, to boost its economy.
Figure 2 shows what percentage of Russia's and other top energy producers' merchandise
exports are fuel. Aside from the extreme example oflraq, Russia's percent fuel export is the

Russian Energy Policy

9

most consistently high. Now, as non-Russian, less expensive oil and gas providers become more
common as another option for Russia's trade partners, Russia will need to diversify its economy
by either subsidizing other industries to take the place of energy as Russia's breadwinner, or
move from oil and gas to newer alternative energy resources (Aron). A diversified economy
would require the Russian government to willingly abdicate the power it holds through its
control over Russia's main economic resource. Since the late 1980s Vladimir Putin has
espoused the importance of oil and natural gas to Russia's economy, and his regime is unlikely
to want to reverse the industry takeover they have been conducting for these past few decades.
However, the national focus on oil and natural gas has weakened other sectors of the economy to
the point that Russia's entire economic health depends on oil and gas prices remaining steady,
which they rarely do (Aron). Developing other sectors of the economy, or another energy source
which would be more economically stable than oil and gas, is the only way to prevent Russia's
economy from crashing every time oil prices drop significantly. This means that in relation to its
economy, Russia does have an interest in developing renewable energy, but it is tempered by the
loss of power that could result from such a move. However, another domestic factor besides the
unstable economy adds to renewable energy's attractiveness. Small, remote areas of far eastern
Russia rely on diesel for energy, but the economic and social effects of diesel production on
these towns create a convincing argument that a new solution is needed. Although it would be
impractical to suggest immediately cutting out the use of diesel altogether, some have suggested
that there is merit to ideas of renewable-diesel hybrid generators. These hybrids - usually using
wind or solar power as the renewable component - could very efficiently reduce the cost and
other negative effects of diesel use and production on rural communities (Boute 20 16).
Additionally, reducing even a small amount of the diesel used for energy production in these

10

Russian Energy Policy
areas could provide a benefit to the environment, likely more susceptible to human disturbance

in these isolated areas of Russia than in areas closer to major towns or cities. With the economic
stabilization and positive environmental effects combined, it seems obvious that Russia does, or
should, have an interest in promoting the development of renewable energy. However, it is
probable that Russia, a country by now accustomed to a state-ruled economy, will not wish to
cede the power it wields through its control of fossil fuels.
Figure 2. Fuel as a Percentage of Merchandise Exports
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According to some experts, the benefits of renewable energy development in Russia
come from outside the country. The European Union has made a commitment to development of
renewable energy, but because of the limited renewable energy potential of some member states
it allows those states to contribute to development of the renewable energy in another country,
outside the EU (Boute et. al. 2012). While primarily the focus has been on helping developing
countries form an energy sector including renewable energies, northwest Russia would be a
prime location for a development program (Boute et. al 20 12). This at first sounds like it helps
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the EU more than Russia. However, in this case a benefit to the EU is also a benefit to Russia,
because in addition to helping develop renewable energy in another country, the EU directive
also requires that the member state must consume the energy by physically importing it to the
EU (Boute et. al2012). Not only would Russia gain social and political capital for helping a
struggling European country meet its goals, but a trade partnership would necessarily form which
could strengthen the energy ties between the EU and Russia. Because Russia's electricity system
is already interconnected with those of many countries in Europe- most notably Norway- the
cost of expanding and reinforcing the interconnection would be minimal compared to creating
entirely new connections (Boute et. al 20 12). Figure 2 demonstrates this network through
pipelines currently transporting oil and natural gas from Russia to Europe. As Figure 2 shows,
Russia and many major urban centers of Europe are already well-connected by oil and gas
pipelines. It would be far easier to expand this infrastructure than to continue struggling to find
nonexistent fossil fuels once the resource has been expended. While at first they may lose some
ground by giving up their stake in fossil fuels, an increase in renewable energy development
could only help Russia's growth over time.
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Figure 3. Russian Oil and Gas Pipelines to Europe
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While some arguments against it are clear, for the most part Russia's interests seem to be
aligned with renewable energy development. The country is practically overflowing with
renewable resources waiting to be harnessed, even in the most remote areas of Russia. Such
development could help stabilize the Russian economy, and reduce poor, rural Russians' reliance
on harmful diesel. Finally, Russia's trade relationship with Europe would be bolstered by the
change, while promoting an idea of Russia as an environmentally friendly country. Working
against all this, however, is Russia's tight economic control, and the state's aversion to releasing
that control in order to allow development of renewable energy by non-state actors. From an
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outside point of view, it appears obvious that the positive effects outweigh one temporary loss in
power, but within Russia the outcome is likely not so clear. The long history of state control,
combined with the chaos which ensued after the initial release of economic control in the early
1990s, likely create a mindset in Russia which refuses to consider the benefits when there is such
an apparent drawback.

What is Russia's true political agenda?
Now that it has shown that Russia does have an interest in developing renewable energy,
this paper will determine whether Russia has any plans or intentions of acting upon that interest.
While the answer may seem obvious, countries do not always implement policy that follows the
course which appears to observers to be in their best interest. While there are many reasons
given for Russia to utilize its potential as a renewable energy supplier, the future of its energy
sector depends on the priorities and decisions of its government.
First it is helpful to look at past energy policy decisions made by Russia, as well as the
image it presents to the world through such actions as participation in the Kyoto Protocol and
explicit statements from the government regarding climate action. Many believe Russia's
actions do not currently match the rhetoric it has held since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol.
Failure to commit to any significant action, including reduction of emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol or renewing its commitment for the next term give the impression that while Russia
wishes to appear environmentally responsible, it has no intention of truly implementing any
policy that will lead to reduced emissions or the development of cleaner, renewable energy
(Vatansever 2012).
A comparison to the actions of other, similar countries can demonstrate a country's
commitment to certain policies. Four countries, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, and China
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and known as BRIC countries, are often examined together for their relatively recent and rapid
economic development. In this case, comparison to other BRIC countries can give an idea of
where Russia stands in renewable energy development. The other BRIC countries have
renewable energy policy which has evolved and grown over time. Russia's, however, has
remained stable- or even stagnant- for decades. The other three countries, China especially,
have noticed success with their renewable energy policy. There seems to be a correlation
between their steadily adapting renewable energy policy and the success of those policies (Zhang
et. al. 2011). Russia, meanwhile, has had little to no success with its renewable energy policy,
and it in some cases its policy seems to actually be harmful to the development of renewable
energy. This result seems connected to the constant nature of Russia's renewable energy policy,
in place since the fall ofthe Soviet Union when it was introduced (Zhang et. al. 2011). If Russia
wants renewable energy development, the government must be up-to-date in its policies and
mandates, rather than relying on the push toward renewable energy to come from the private
sector. Its decision to allow those policies to stagnate for so long indicates an agenda which is
focused elsewhere. In addition, an examination of the trends of energy-producing countries over
time can provide a comparison to show Russia's relative progress toward renewable energy.
Figure 3 compares Russia's electricity composition to that of seven other energy-focused
countries, as well as the world average. It shows what percentage of each country's electricity
has come from fossil fuels since 1990, and what it shows is somewhat surprising given the
Zhang et. al. (20 11) study which indicated Russia was doing a poor job developing renewable
energy, compared to other BRIC countries. According to Figure 3, Russia stays almost exactly
even with the world average, and is actually less dependent on fossil fuels than the US . A
comparison between the other sample countries and Brazil shows that Brazil is actually the
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outlier, not Russia- its reliance on fossil fuels is abnormally low. It is likely that this is due to
Brazil's use of ethanol-powered vehicles, a circumstance which is somewhat unusual in the field
of energy producers.
Figure 3. Percentage of Electricity from Coal, Oil, and Natural Gas Sources
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Current and past actions taken by the Russian government are good indications of what
will happen in the future. Russia's use of its position as a major global energy supplier to
influence nearby countries, including the European Union, powerfully demonstrates how Russia
will act on renewable energy policy. Because Russia is such a prolific generator of oil and
natural gas, it has the ability to encourage other countries to follow its requests by utilizing the
threat to withhold necessary resources or increase prices. This strategy has been notably used in
situations like the dispute over territory in the Ukraine, and many worry that Russia is currently
using the EU's dependence on their oil and natural gas supplies to influence decisions made
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there (Woehrel2008). Now that renewable energy is becoming more of a ptiority in the
European Union, Russia may have to prioritize its development as well in order to maintain its
political foothold in countries that have formerly imported its oil and gas. However, Russia is no
doubt unwilling to decrease production of oil and natural gas when there are still many countries
which would prefer to buy traditional fuel sources as opposed to renewable energy.
Furthermore, some say that there was never a strategy in Russia to use oil prices and
supplies to influence policy in neighboring countries, and it is very possible that if it had ever
existed, this strategy would have suddenly become ineffective. Recently the European Union
has integrated its energy policy for member states, making each one less vulnerable to individual
pressures (Boersma 2016). However, as mentioned previously, the European Union's energy
directives are encouraging use of renewable energy and allowing for the use of other countries'
electricity resources in order to meet their goals. Therefore, Russia now has another way of
influencing EU member states. As an ironic twist, the very integration which some have seen as
an escape from Russian influence could provide Russia with a more efficient angle, allowing the
country to influence the whole of the EU rather than individual countries. It is likely then that if
Russia does use its energy policy to influence other countries, it is planning to develop renewable
energy if only to keep its neighbors dependent. With the political power inherently held by a
controlling supplier like Russia- a power that Russia is naturally unwilling to give up- it seems
increasingly likely that the country will follow the market wherever it leads. However, this
flexible approach leads to a mixed answer for the research question. While Russia clearly has a
desire to carry on influencing the European Union, which is more susceptible recently to
pressure from the renewable energy market, the need to continue supplying its other consumers
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with traditional oil and natural gas may be preventing Russia from firmly deciding to promote
renewable energy development (Paillard 201 0).
With the mixed results from a review of Russia's current and past decisions and trends,
no answer to this research question seems clear. It is possible that Russia's agenda does plan for
increased development of renewable energy, in order to keep up with changing markets.
However, a multitude of other factors make it equally likely that Russia would rather continue
with the same keystone that has been vital to its economic success since the fall of the Soviet
Union.

Who influences Russia's policymaking process?
The final answer this paper needs in order to predict Russia's future energy policy is the
major players that have the ability to affect the policy coming out of the Russian government.
The interests of Russia and its intentions only matter if the actors controlling policy are
receptive. Therefore, this section of the paper will identify the actors that have a large amount of
influence in Russian policymaking.
The Russian national gas company Gazprom is deeply connected to the success and
policy direction of the state of Russia. The ties were created when the state became a major
shareholder in the company. "This created a new interpretation of Russia's interests as
coinciding with the interests of Gazprom[ ... ]" (Kazantsev). Not only did this stock purchase
give the state major influence in the future ofGazprom, Gazprom ' s actions now had the ability
to affect the government. As the Russian government used its new influence in the energy
industry to natural gas exports in the region, the economy came to depend more on Gazprom for
success. Therefore, when oil prices dropped significantly in 2009, Russia' s economy suffered as
much as Gazprom. This was partially a result of the weakening of non-energy sectors, and
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partially a result of the sheer size of the energy sector in Russia. Gazprom was, in the words
used by many to describe American banks during the same global economic crisis, "too big to
fail." One researcher states, though he is careful to warn that predictions in this area are
uncertain, that this has led to the end of the idea of an "energy super-state" promoted from the
start of Vladimir Putin' s leadership of Russia (Kasantsev 201 0). Russia is likely to make policy
less directly related to energy development because of the crisis in 2009. The answer this creates
for the question of who influences Russia's policymaking process is therefore two-sided.
Gazprom has no doubt had a significant influence over Russia's political decision-making, but it
seems clear that future policy will be less influenced by Gazprom and the energy sector in
general. Ironically, because Gazprom's failure spurred this decision, it could actually be seen as
a sign of major influence. Unlike Gazprom's declining success, the Russian oil companies have
been expanding and likely have more control than ever (Woehrel2008). However, Russia's
foreign policy has occasionally been shaped in a way which benefited Gazprom; when Gazprom
wanted to buy the Serbian national oil company, they easily succeeded at a lower cost after
Russia made clear its opposition to the bid for independence made by Kosovo, a Serbian
province (Woehrel2008).
A second, unexpected actor is organized crime. Russia's underworld leaders, likely
similar to those who ruled the country after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, are suspected to
be involved in Ukrainian energy firm RosUkrEnergo -half of which is owned by Gazprom
(Woehrel2008). Gazprom's influence in the government then allows a path for organized crime,
if the suspicions of criminal relationship to RosUkrEnergo are true. In addition, these criminals
are believed to have connections to certain corrupt Russian officials (Woehrel 2008). Organized
crime then has two ways to influence the decision-making of the Russian government, especially
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when it comes to energy policy. With the criminal leaders' involvement in oil and gas
companies like RosUkrEnergo, it seems likely that these influencers would prefer that Russia's
energy policy stay focused on traditional fossil fuels, rather than renewable energy. While this
influence is not as strong as that of the state energy companies, the possibility of involvement
from the same type of actors who once ruled Russia is a factor which cannot be ignored.
Russian energy policy, like all policy, weaves through a complex web of actors- both
within the state and without- and makes identifying the key actors difficult. However, Gazprom
has obviously held a great deal of influence over the years, and despite the mid-2000s financial
crisis, it is difficult to believe that the company's influence has completely dissipated. In
addition, a criminal element that many assumed to have lost their political power have been
shown to have a certain amount of influence, although they certainly are not the most significant
actors in Russian policy. Both influences seem likely to steer Russia in the seemingly safe,
steady direction of traditional energy policy, with no deviations for renewable energy
development.
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Conclusion
Predicting the actions of a foreign entity is, naturally, a complex task. It is likely that if
such a thing were truly possible, most conflicts would be over before they began. However, with
enough evidence it is possible to estimate a country's future policy direction. In the case of
Russia, previous literature and data provided a mostly complete catalogue of evidence to indicate
what direction the country's renewable energy policy would take. While certain answers are
open to multiple interpretations, the research questions answered in the body of this paper
provide a reasonably clear picture of Russia's renewable energy future. Although Russia's
interest coincides with renewable energy development, it seems unlikely that Russia will choose
to pursue this line of policy. The resources exist, but the cost for the Russian establishment is
currently too high and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The economic cost, no
matter how temporary, and the ensuing loss of power for the state, are sacrifices that the Russian
government has shown it is not willing to make. While Russia seems to display interest in
renewable energy and environmentally friendly policies, no real change actually takes place.
The stakes are too high, and political shareholders have too many reasons to prefer traditional
fuel sources, including an existing market and trade relationships. Therefore, while the
conclusion of this research states that Russia could certainly benefit economically long-term
from promoting renewable energy development on a national scale, the country is unlikely to
deviate from the current course, which involves continued exploitation of fossil fuels, with more
money and effort going to the cause over time, as those resources become more and more scarce.
This research has reached a definite conclusion, but it is recommended that for a more
accurate representation of Russia's intent and plans, more research should be done on this
subject. Of a particular interest would be personal interviews with experts, including
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representatives from Russia itself, as well as the Ukraine to provide the perspective of a close,
and closely tied, neighbor to Russia. Certain scholars could also provide more detailed
information in an interview setting, as little of the current literature specifically attempts to
predict the future energy policy of Russia. It seems likely that the results will be the same, but
without the clarity that further research can provide, it is impossible to say for certain. Russia
appears to be intentionally ambiguous about its plans for renewable energy- probably as an
attempt to carry on the

fa~ade

of environmental progress that it has cultivated through its public

rhetoric and involvement in the Kyoto Protocol. In the end, it is unfortunately likely that it really
is only a fa<;:ade, and not a true indication of where Russia has placed its priorities.
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